Abstract:
Introduction
eg S resou N otiators face two related tasks, value claiming and value creation (Lax & ebenius 1985) . Value creation refers to those processes that increase the rces available to negotiators and is often described as 'increasing the size of the pie'. Value claiming describes how those resources are distributed between negotiators and determines the size of the slice that an individual receives. Value creation offers several benefits to negotiators, including the identification of all available resources, the ability to meet the aspirations of both parties and the creation of more stable and enduring agreements (Pruitt 1983) . Nonetheless, negotiators frequently display considerable difficulty in reaping these benefits. As a result, two questions continue to provide central themes for negotiation research. This first is 'What are the factors that facilitate or inhibit the identification of mutually beneficial solutions?' The first section of the article touches on this question by providing an overview of negotiation research. The second question is 'How do negotiation processes shape negotiators' final outcomes?' The remaining sections, which focus on post-1990 research, address the link between process and negotiators' outcomes.
Negotiation Research: Setting the Scene
Early investigations of negotiation focused on how two factors, individual differences and situational characteristics, influenced negotiations. This research highlighted the relationship between the following external factors, negotiators' behaviour and their outcomes. Accountability to others, the expectation of future interactions, power and motivational orientation were all shown to be influential in shaping negotiations. With the introduction of Behavioural Decision Theory (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky 1973) , the focus shifted to negotiators' cognition. This research demonstrated that negotiators exhibited several well known decisionmaking biases and identified two-the fixed-pie bias and the incompatibility bias-that were specific to negotiation (e.g. Neale & Bazerman 1991) . Following the wave of cognitive research, negotiation researchers have again focused on the more social aspects of negotiation, including the development and influence of the negotiating relationship, the role of trust and emotion, as well as on questions of ethical behaviour. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an extensive review of this research. There are, however, several excellent reviews that undertake this task (e.g. Bazerman, Curhan, Moore & Valley 2000) A separate strand of negotiation research has focused on negotiators' communication. This research stems from the recognition that negotiation is a dynamic process and that negotiators' strategies evolve over time. One implication is that although context and cognition shape final outcomes, they are not the sole determinants of those outcomes. Indeed, neither set of variables can successfully account for the variance that we observe across dyads bargaining in the same context. Even when dyads bargain in an objectively identical setting, they obtain outcomes that range from impasse to high joint gain (e.g. Olekalns, Smith & Walsh 1996) . One explanation for this variance is that, despite identical bargaining conditions, negotiators make different strategy choices. This explanation highlights the importance of investigating communication processes in negotiation. It also shifts the level of analysis from the individual negotiator to the dyad. In the following sections I discuss two consequences of this shift, the role of strategy timing and dyad composition in shaping negotiation outcomes.
Strategy Timing in Negotiation
Early research examining strategy and communication focused on the influence of first offers and patterns of concession-making, subsequently expanding its purview to examine two distinct relationships, strategy-outcome and context-strategy. Analyses of the strategy-outcome relationship link the use of problem solving and information exchange to high joint gain, and the use of contention to low joint gain (e.g. De Dreu, Weingart & Soon 2000) . These analyses also enable us to distinguish between those strategies that lead to settlement without creating value from those that do create value (Olekalns & Weingart 2001) . Researchers investigating the context-strategy link show that external factors such as social motives, tactical knowledge and culture shape negotiators' strategy choices (e.g. Adair et al. 1998; Olekalns & Smith, in press; Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula 1996) . More recently, analyses of the situation-strategy-outcome relationship challenge the commonly held view that understanding underlying needs and interests provides the sole path to high joint gain. They demonstrate, instead, that the strategies that successfully create value are context-dependent (e.g. Adair et al. 1998; O'Connor 1997; Olekalns & Smith, in press; 2001a) .
Analyses, such as those described in the preceding paragraph, that limit themselves to examining the frequency with which strategies are used, neglect the adaptive aspect of negotiation. Over time, negotiators change strategies in response to both the other party and an approaching deadline. In the early 1980s, communication scholars moved beyond a focus on single strategies to examine the relationship between the sequencing and timing of strategies and outcomes. This resulted in the recognition that not only how frequently strategies are used, but also when they are used, is critical to negotiators' outcomes. In the remainder of this section, I focus on post-1990 research that addresses the issue of strategy timing.
Strategy sequences-how one negotiator responds to another-capture one aspect of timing. In examining the context-sequence relationship, research has demonstrated that tactical knowledge shapes the kinds of sequences that characterise negotiations (Weingart, Prietula, Hyder & Genovese 1999) . Analyses of the sequence-outcome relationship show that negotiators who reach agreement differ from those who fail to do so in their ability to blend cooperative and competitive strategies (Olekalns & Smith 2000a) . They further show that the addition of interest-based messages can disrupt the contentious cycles typically associated with stalemate (Brett, Shapiro & Lytle 1998) . Once in the settlement zone, reciprocating positional arguments leads to low joint gain whereas reciprocating priority information and trade-offs leads to high joint gain (Olekalns & Smith 2000a; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman & Carroll 1990) . Finally, analyses of the context-strategy-outcome link show that reciprocity is critical to high joint gain when negotiators are cooperatively motivated but not when they are competitively motivated (Olekalns & Smith, in press; 2001a) .
Phase models, which propose that the effectiveness of strategies is timesensitive, address the issue of timing at a broader level. Stage models, which assume that negotiations move through a series of three fixed stages, provide one example of phase models. Using a stage model framework, researchers have shown that negotiators emphasise different strategies and sequences of strategies in the beginning, middle and end stages of a negotiation (Lytle, Brett & Shapiro 1999; Olekalns et al. 1996; Olekalns & Smith 2000a) . Research shows that negotiators' ability to create value is determined by their strategic flexibility: whereas negotiators who obtain low joint gain consistently use contentious strategies, those who create value show increasing flexibility and problem-solving over time (Olekalns et al. 1996) .
Episodic models take a more dynamic view of negotiations. Episodes are defined as uninterrupted sequences of a single strategy, and episode shifts are defined by changes in strategy. These models imply that instead of unfolding smoothly, negotiations are punctuated by a series of events that shape the overall negotiating dynamic (e.g. Druckman 2001; Gray, Younglove-Webb & Purdy 1997). In the spirit of episodic models, our research has shown that negotiators identify a range of turning points in their negotiations; and, that the kinds of turning points they identify influence overall levels of trust, as well as joint outcomes (Olekalns & Smith 2001b) .
Communication Patterns and Research Directions
Analyses of negotiators' communication identify two broad trends. First, they suggest that while there is only one path to low joint gain, there are several paths to high joint gain. These paths are highly context sensitive and one constructive avenue for future research is to continue exploring the links between context, communication patterns and paths to high joint gain. In this context, interaction goals provide a useful construct for developing a more general typology of how external factors shape the negotiation process (Wilson & Putnam 1990) . A second important finding that emerges is the role of sequences of strategies. Several studies show that the sequences linked to value creation often incorporate otherwise infrequently used strategies, suggesting that their use is highly salient and may act as a turning point in negotiation (Olekalns & Smith, in press; 2000a; 2001a; Weingart et al. 1990 ). These findings link the dynamics of dyadic negotiations to those observed by Druckman (2001) in the context of international negotiations. They identify a second avenue for research, that is a more systematic exploration of how these unexpected communication events are recognised and their consequences for negotiation.
How Dyad Composition Affects Negotiation
Manipulations of the negotiation context tell us how a range of external factors shapes negotiation processes and outcomes. Very often, however, these findings are in the context of negotiators holding the same attribute, for example negotiating within the same culture or with the same social motives. What happens when two negotiators hold different attributes? Research suggests that perceived similarities (or differences) affect both intangible and tangible outcomes. For example, the relationship between outcomes and negotiators' gain or loss frames depends in part on whether the other party holds the same or a different frame (Bottom & Studt 1993; Olekalns 1994; . Extending this finding, research shows that negotiators with similar attributes are more likely to maximize joint gain than negotiators who are dissimilar, either in their cultural background or in their social motives (Olekalns & Smith 2001a) . Moreover, the experience of individuals in same-or mixed attribute dyads is qualitatively different. Compared to negotiators in mixed-orientation dyads, those in sameorientation dyads have a more similar representation of the task, are more likely to perceive their outcome as fair, and are more willing to negotiate with the other party again (Olekalns & Smith 2000b) .
The effects of dyad composition also shape negotiators communication processes. In a cross-cultural context, Adair, Okumura and Brett (2001) demonstrated much higher levels of reciprocity in same-culture than in mixedculture dyads. Olekalns and Smith (1999; 2001a) showed that dyad composition, as determined by negotiators' social value orientations, also shapes strategies. Mixed dyads developed a negotiating style that was not characteristic of either cooperative or competitive dyads. Moreover, a unique set of strategy sequences was linked to high joint gain for each dyad type, suggesting that the path to high joint gain is shaped by dyad composition (Olekalns & Smith 2001a) . Finally, returning to the issue of strategy timing, De Dreu and co-workers (1994) demonstrated a 'behavioural assimilation' effect in negotiators' communication patterns: negotiators who were framed to view the negotiation in terms of gains adjusted their communication to match that of their partner (a computer) whereas lossframed negotiators did not.
Dyad Composition and Research Directions
The research described in the preceding section highlights the need to further consider dyad composition and directs our attention to the issue of shared representations (frames) of the task. It raises the question of how negotiators signal, develop and maintain a shared perspective. One answer to this question comes from an examination of how communication is structured. Communication theory suggests that when negotiators match each others' strategies, they signal similarity and build the negotiating relationship. If this pattern of matching increases over time, negotiators are displaying interpersonal adaptation that serves to reinforce relational closeness (e.g. Burgoon, Stern & Dillman 1995) . Both patterns should predict frame convergence. Conversely, mismatching and an increase in mismatching over time, signal decreasing relational closeness. These patterns should predict frame divergence. Although these communication patterns are observed in negotiation (e.g. Donohue, Diez & Hamilton 1984; Olekalns & Smith 2000a; Putnam & Jones 1982) , we are yet to understand fully what triggers matching or mismatching, or their consequences for the negotiating relationship. Together with an increased understanding of the role played by dyad composition, an investigation of how communication patterns assist in frame convergence and the impact that such convergence or divergence has on negotiation outcomes, provides a fruitful avenue for future research.
Implications
The analyses of communication patterns over time have at least two practical implications. First, they give negotiators new tools for managing unproductive negotiating dynamics. Our research suggests that the introduction of new or unexpected strategies can help negotiators to change the negotiating dynamic (also ). The analysis of strategy sequences is paralleled by our analysis of turning points, which shows that both the negotiating relationship and outcomes are influenced by the kinds of events that become salient during a negotiation. Both levels of analysis suggest that negotiations do not progress smoothly and that negotiators can strategically intervene to improve the negotiating process. Second, they highlight the importance of first impressions in negotiation. Negotiators who establish similarity at the outset of negotiations improve both their tangible and intangible outcomes. I have argued that communication plays an important role in establishing similarity and improving the negotiating relationship. For negotiators, these findings highlight the importance of establishing rapport at the outset of negotiations and structuring their communication in a way that maintains that rapport.
Turning to negotiation theory, research highlights the role of both social perception and communication in shaping negotiation processes and outcomes. However, investigations in this field are few and disparate in direction. We know that these processes are important but we have yet to fully understand them. In the case of social perception, research is yet to link perceived similarity (first impressions) to other aspects of negotiation, including strategy choices, the development of the negotiation relationship and value creation. Similarly, although communication research has addressed the relationship between strategy choices and value creation, it is yet to systematically explore two important aspects of communication: sequencing and phasing. Most importantly, with a small number of exceptions, research has not examined the more complex relationships between situational factors, social perception, communication and value creation. Negotiation research also needs to undertake a systematic examination of these more complex relationships. 
